the Israeli-Palestinian conf lict-he has achieved virtually no significant political gains.
From this perspective, it can clearly be concluded that his achievements are limited. In the end, his undeniably extraordinary popularity and charisma were of little avail. Notwithstanding his skillful management of the Arab Spring, the only real strategic surprise he had to face, his credibility in the Muslim world has since steadily eroded. Rightly or wrongly, the Cairo speech's promises have not been kept. Obama's only real great breakthrough in foreign policy, and by no means an insignificant one, was to release the United States from the hold of the ideology of September 11 in which the previous administration had deliberately kept the country. Jettisoning the war-on-terror rhetoric allowed the United States to regain a strategic political legitimacy that it had partly lost, without lowering its military guard. This was no easy feat. Jimmy Carter had sought to break away from Richard Nixon and Vietnam, but US conduct was rightly or wrongly interpreted as that of a weak and indecisive state, for which he paid dearly in Iran and Afghanistan. While Obama is not Carter, he has also not been a "Nixon in China" who is able to turn the tables and propose to Iran, Pakistan, and to some extent Israel, new rules that take account of America's broader interests while incorporating those of its three partners: a declared enemy (Iran), a frenemy (Pakistan), and a key ally (Israel). This inability to change the strategic reality owes much to Obama's personality. As a careful man whose only doctrine is pragmatism, it could be said that Obama is a pragmatic doctrinaire. Due to the color of his skin, he must constantly prove that he is an American patriot, because his election has not eliminated the US color line.
1 But beyond the man is the American and global system. Obama remains a constrained president on most issues. He is constrained by the choices of his predecessors; by the severity of the economic and financial crisis that is forcing the United States to be increasingly more selective in choosing its commitments; by Congress's ideological and political inf luence; by the polarization of American society, which is turning its back on liberal values to endorse libertarian and antistatist values; and finally by the power structure of other international actors. When Nixon made his trip to China he only had to deal with one interlocutor, who was moreover able to maintain secrecy. Additionally, in a bipolar configuration, the gains were almost automatic: the overture to Beijing weakened the USSR.
The United States faces much more complex diplomatic and strategic relations today. Concerning Iran, Obama must confront unstable
